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This paper describes four functionally distinct operations carried out in forming 
an impression of another person: Initial encoding, elaborative encoding, inte- 
gration, and decision. These processes were identified empirically on the basis 
of their differential sensitivity to the amount and the consistency of information 
in a trait description. In Study 1 as the trait set increased in size, processing 
was hindered to the greatest extent during initial encoding, to a moderate extent 
during elaborative encoding, and least during the integration-decision interval. 
Varying consistency produced the opposite pattern of results, that is, an incon- 
sistent trait description hindered processing the least during initial encoding, a 
moderate amount during elaborative encoding, and the most during the integra- 
tion-decision interval. In Study 2 the quantity of information was manipulated 
via implicit knowledge, that is, the associative structure activated by the trait 
(rather than set size). Because implicit information is “preintegrated,” impli- 
cation-rich traits did not hinder initial or elaborative encoding more than impli- 
cation-poor traits. The decision operation, however, was performed more rapidly 
with implication-rich traits than with implication-poor ones, which strongly sug- 
gests that once information is integrated, the “richer” the representation, the 
easier it is to arrive at a decision. 
Traditionally, research on social judgments in general, and impression 
formation in particular, has been concerned with the functional rela- 
tionship between properties of the judgment (e.g., the extremity of the 
impression) and properties of the stimulus information (e.g., the number 
of traits, their consistency). Until a few years ago there had been rel- 
atively little explication of the mental operations involved in forming 
such opinions. However, because of recent theoretical and methodolog- 
ical developments in cognitive psychology, considerable effort is now 
being made to analyze these operations (Carlston, 1980; Ebbesen, 1980; 
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Hastie & Carlston, 1980; Srull & Wyer, 1979; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). 
The present research continues this line of analysis in attempting to 
isolate the processes underlying impression formation by chronometric 
methods. 
We propose to divide the mental operations involved in impression 
formation into four classes: initial encoding, elaborative encoding, in- 
tegration, and decision. We will focus on the latter two since they are 
unique to impression formation (see below). Initial and elaborative en- 
coding primarily will serve as baseline operations for specifying those 
functions peculiar to integration and decision. For convenience of pre- 
sentation each class of operations is referred to as a single process. 
Whether the above partition is in fact meaningful will be shown by the 
differential sensitivity of these processes to features of the stimulus in- 
formation. More specifically, individuals will be presented with sets of 
traits that vary in size (i.e., number of traits) and affective consistency 
(i.e., all positive or negative, or mixed). The individuals will then perform 
an orienting task that involves one (or more) of the above operations 
(cf. Craik & Tulving, 1975). 
During initial encoding the external stimulus undergoes perceptual 
analysis and segmentation (Newtson, 1973; Ebbesen, 1980) whereby it 
is transformed into symbolic structures-the memory codes (e.g., Posner, 
1978). Functionally, these operations associate a separate memory code 
with each piece of information in the external stimulus. In the present 
studies initial encoding will be induced by an orienting task that involves 
physical matching (Posner & Keele, 1967). That is to say, a set of traits 
are shown on a video monitor and individuals indicate when they have 
finished reading them. Immediately following this, the traits are replaced 
by a probe (a single trait) and individuals indicate whether or not the 
probe appeared in the previous set. The time needed to read a set is 
taken as a measure of the processing required to prepare the traits for 
physical matching. The operations involved in this preparation are as- 
sumed to correspond to those of initial encoding, that is, each piece of 
information is encoded separately with minimal semantic analysis, per- 
haps none beyond what is performed automatically whenever such codes 
are activated by semantic material [the Stroop effect (Dyer, 1973) is a 
good example of such a phenomenon; also, cf., Posner. 1972 for a detailed 
discussion of automatic activation of one type of code by another]. This 
suggests that initial encoding ought to be most sensitive to features 
associated with the separate elements in the set (e.g., the number of 
traits), and least sensitive to relationships between these elements (e.g., 
their consistency). 
Once information has made contact with memory, elaborative encod- 
ing may occur. This involves linking the pieces of information extracted 
from the external stimulus with prior knowledge. Prior knowledge is 
IMPRESSION FORMATION 219 
assumed to be represented in the form of schemata. Each schema is 
conceived as a set of propositions that describe either some prototypical 
series of events (i.e., a script, in Schank & Abelson, 1977) or objects 
(i.e., a frame in Minsky, 1975; Friedman, 1979). The knowledge rep- 
resented within a schema serves two purposes: First, it specifies which 
stimuli can be matched to or instantiate the schema. Second, when 
instantiation occurs, information in the stimulus is supplemented by 
knowledge contained in the schema. The latter is said to be knowledge 
introduced by default; that is, it specifies those features that typically 
occur in such a context when they are not explicitly given in the stimulus. 
A more detailed discussion of schemata can be found elsewhere (e.g., 
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). 
Therefore, under elaborative encoding, the pattern of information ac- 
tivated by a trait description will include not only the memory codes that 
correspond to the description itself, but also representations of the default 
knowledge contained in the encoding schema (Carlston, 1980). For ex- 
ample, upon hearing that Igor is a professor at Ivy University we may 
infer that Igor wears glasses and a tweed jacket, is intelligent and married, 
etc. The elaborations follow from instantiation of the interpreting schema. 
In our example this means that stereotypic knowledge about Ivy pro- 
fessors is applied to Igor. 
It should be noted that some integration may occur during elaborative 
encoding. Of course, in principle, each trait in a description can be 
encoded within different schemata. On many an occasion, however, two 
or more traits will be interpreted within a single schema. As a result, 
rather than being represented piecemeal, these traits are chunked to- 
gether and encoded as an integrated structure. We refer to this process 
as automatic so as to stress that integration occurs as a consequence 
of comprehension and takes place unintentionally, without conscious 
effort on the part of the individual (deliberate integration is discussed 
below). Generally, automatic integration will happen when two or more 
propositions are thematically related and there is a schema activated 
during comprehension that encodes this relationship (e.g., Ostrom, Lin- 
gle, Pryor, & Geva. 1980; Smith, Adams, & Schorr, 1978; Schul & 
Burnstein, Note 1). 
To induce individuals to elaboratively encode each trait in a set, they 
will be asked to perform an orienting task that involves semantic match- 
ing. As in physical matching, individuals indicate when they have com- 
pleted reading the trait set. However, when the probe-trait is displayed, 
the individuals are to say whether or not it is similar in meaning (rather 
than identical) to one of the traits in the set. The time used to prepare 
for semantic matching is assumed to reflect the operations required for 
elaborative encoding. As in initial encoding, this process should also be 
sensitive to the amount of information, that is, the number of traits in 
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a set. Furthermore, recall that if traits are automatically integrated, they 
are encoded within the same schema; otherwise, they are encoded sep- 
arately. Thus, in automatic integration the encoding of one element fa- 
cilitates (primes) the encoding of another element-the knowledge struc- 
ture used to interpret the former is immediately available to interpret 
the latter. This implies that when traits are automatically integrated, they 
will be processed faster than when they are interpreted one at a time 
within separate schemata. [See similar findings in lexical priming (Meyer 
& Schvaneveldt, 1971; Schvaneveldt & Meyer, 1973.1 Automatic inte- 
gration is more likely when the traits in the set are consistent than when 
they are inconsistent. Therefore, we expect that under elaborative en- 
coding (unlike initial encoding) processing time will vary with consistency. 
Impression formation, of course, involves more than initial and elab- 
orative encoding. On many occasions, a person has to make a judgment 
that takes into account a variety of traits for which no unitary interpre- 
tation immediately comes to mind. Individuals may choose one of two 
strategies for dealing with this problem: They can integrate the infor- 
mation either by discounting part of it (Abelson, 1968), or by searching 
for alternative schemata that are atypical (i.e., rarely activated in the 
situation and, hence, relatively inaccessible) but that will nonetheless 
accommodate all the information in a consistent fashion. 
Our conjecture is that, at least in studies of impression formation, the 
likelihood of calling an atypical schema is higher than that of using the 
discounting solution. There seem to be two reasons for this: First, be- 
cause our knowledge of people in real life is so rich, we are almost 
always able to take traits that are inconsistent in their typical context 
and find another context in which they would be consistent (e.g., or- 
dinarily it is difficult to conceive of someone being “good” and “a thief,” 
but the difficulty disappears if we imagine that this person is Robin 
Hood). Second, discounting strategies, at least in the laboratory, are 
usually inhibited by instructions to assign each trait equal weight. [See 
also Hendrick and Constantini (1970) for the failure of discounting mech- 
anisms in explaining “order effects in impression formation.“] But re- 
gardless of the strategy chosen, integration involves the reconciliation 
of inconsistencies. Hence, trait information will be represented in a more 
consistent fashion after integration than it had been before (Burnstein 
& Schul, Note 2; Wyer, 1974). 
Recall that under elaborative encoding consistent elements may be 
automatically integrated, whereas inconsistent elements are likely to be 
processed separately and represented by independent (and still incon- 
sistent) memory codes. In other words, although inconsistencies do not 
have to be reconciled under elaborative encoding, they do under inte- 
gration. This implies, first, that differences between the time to process 
consistent and inconsistent trait sets ought to be more pronounced in 
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integration than in elaborative encoding (or initial encoding); second, 
that integration will become more time consuming as the number of to- 
be-integrated traits increases; and third, that the effects of increasing the 
number of to-be-integrated traits on processing time should be aggravated 
when the traits are inconsistent. The latter interaction (set size x con- 
sistency) reflects a characteristic of information structures in general and 
semantic network in particular, namely, that the difficulty in reconciling 
inconsistent information increases exponentially with the number of ele- 
ments in the network. 
Integration prepares the information for a final operation, the decision. 
This process interprets the now-integrated information within the context 
of an evaluative schema and translates the evaluation into a response 
format, such as a C&point scale, a nod, or a smile [see Upshaws (1969) 
attempt to specify a model for such operations; also Parducci, 19651. It 
is important to note that the decision is performed following integration, 
that is, after inconsistencies in the description have been minimized. The 
decision process, therefore, should be invariant with the initial consist- 
ency of the trait description. At the same time, it should be sensitive 
to the amount of information contained in the (integrated) description. 
The latter effect, however, is likely to be opposite to that anticipated 
during initial and elaborative encoding, that is, the more knowledge 
people have about someone they are to judge, the easier and the more 
rapid their decision, once this knowledge has been integrated (Posner 
& Snyder, 1975). In the first study, the trait descriptions used to form 
an impression do not allow us to distinguish the effects of integration 
from those of decision. In the second study, however, trait descriptions 




Thirty students at the University of Michigan served as subjects. They were recruited 
through an advertisement in local papers and were paid $3.50 for their participation. 
Stimuli 
Sets were constructed from 48 traits taken from Anderson (1968). Half of the traits were 
positive (scale values between 430 and 573) and half negative (scale values between 26 
and 169). The sets varied in size and consistency: They contained either two traits (the 
small sets) or four traits (the large sets). Within a set, traits were either consistent (all 
positive or all negative) or inconsistent (half positive, half negative). 
By taking the same 48 traits in different orders 64 sets were constructed (i.e., eight 
replications for each type of set). Each trait was used four times in the 64 sets, but none 
of the traits appeared more than once with any other trait. These will be termed the 
experimental sets. In a similar way, using a different group of 48 traits, we constructed 
64 additional sets that served as fillers. Finally, 16 more sets were constructed for use 
during the practice. 
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Apparatus 
Subjects were seated in individual booths, equipped with a 12-in. CRT monitor, two 
movable buttons labeled “yes” and “no,” and a six-button response box (buttons labeled 
from “1” to “6”). The “yes” button was moved to the subject’s dominant hand. Pre- 
sentation of the stimuli was controlled by a PDP-I1 computer system with responses and 
reaction times recorded under the program control. 
Procedure 
Each experimental session was divided into three parts in the following order: 
1. Physical marching or semanric matching. During this part subjects performed one 
of the first two orienting tasks. Fifteen of them were given physical matching instructions 
and the remaining 15 semantic matching instructions. Under physical marching a set of 
traits was displayed on the CRT and subjects had to press the “yes” button as soon as 
they had read the entire set. The set was erased from the screen following the subject’s 
response. Immediately afterward, a probe (a single trait) was displayed. Subjects then had 
to press the “yes” button if the probe had appeared in the prior set, and the “no” button 
otherwise. Following this response, the probe was erased from the screen. There were 
128 trials in this part, with an interval of 1.5 set between trials. Under semantic marching 
the instructions were similar to those for the physical matching task except for the matching 
criterion, that is, subjects had to press the “yes” button if the probe-trait was similar in 
meaning to one of the traits in the set, and “no” otherwise. 
In half of the trials the probe did not match the traits in the set. These were the 
“experimental” sets (see above). In the remaining cases (fillers) the probe matched the 
set. This was done so that the probe would not prime a meaning (cf. Higgins, Rholes, 
& Jones, 1977). and thereby result in a faster response during the next phase of the study. 
2. Impression formation. All subjects then performed the impression formation task. 
During each trial a message appeared on the screen saying, “Person #m is characterized 
by the following set of traits. How FAVORABLE is your impression of this person?” 
(m represents the trial number). Shortly afterward (0.5 set) the message was erased and 
subjects were presented with one of the experimental trait sets. They responded by pressing 
the button that corresponded to their impression (1 = very unfavorable. . 6 = very 
favorable). The scale with the above labels appeared on the screen throughout. There were 
64 trials in this part. 
3. Consistency ratings. Following impression formation, subjects rated each experimental 
set for its consistency on a 6-point scale (1 = very inconsistent. 6 = very consistent). 
Because of time constraints, only those who had participated under physical matching 
instructions were used for this purpose. 
To familiarize the subjects with the response mode, the first two parts of the study were 
preceded by 32 trials in which numbers served as stimuli. Following each “number” task, 
subjects had 16 warm-up trials with traits from the practice sets. Subjects received the 
stimuli in different random orders, and could perform at their own pace. They were 
instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as they could, but not to trade accuracy 
for speed. 
Results and Discussion 
First, let us determine whether our consistency manipulation was suc- 
cessful. The “recognition” subjects rated each trait set for its consistency 
on a 6-point scale. A three-way repeated measures analysis of variance 
(set size x consistency x sets) was performed on these ratings. The 
consistency effect was highly reliable (F(1, 14) = 181) with all positive 
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or all negative trait sets being rated as more consistent than the mixed 
ones (M’s = 4.36, 3.17, respectively).’ The set-size effect failed to reach 
significance (F(1, 14) = 1.6, p > .2). Finally, the interaction between set 
size and consistency was reliable (F(1, 14) = 20.3), indicating that there 
was a greater difference between consistent and inconsistent large sets 
than between small ones. 
During the first task, physical or semantic matching, each subject 
responded twice per trial. The first response, upon reading the trait set, 
indicated processing time for initial encoding (under physical matching) 
or elaborative encoding (under semantic matching). The second, made 
after the probe trait, merely carried through with the rationale given the 
subjects for the task and is used as a measure of the subject’s accuracy.2 
Each subject in each part provided 64 latencies, 16 in each combination 
of set size and consistency. Because the distribution of these scores was 
highly skewed (resulting in nonindependence between means and vari- 
ance), we performed the following analyses on the median latencies from 
each combination of set size and consistency. These medians were taken 
from the correct responses only on the encoding tasks (part 1) and from 
all responses on the impression task (part 2) where accuracy was 
irrelevant .3 
Table 1 presents the means of the latencies. A two-way repeated 
measure ANOVA (set size x consistency) was performed on these 
scores, separately for initial encoding and for elaborative encoding. In 
addition, a three-way repeated measures ANOVA (set size x consistency 
x first task) was performed on the impression times. 
Initial encoding. Subjects responded reliably faster (F(1, 14) = 92.8) 
to small sets than to large sets. Also, consistent sets were processed 
faster than inconsistent ones (F(1, 14) = 9.15). Finally, the interaction 
between set size and consistency was reliable (F(1, 14) = 6.56), indicating 
that differences between consistent and inconsistent descriptions were 
more pronounced for large trait sets than those for small ones. This 
tallies with the finding (above) that large sets were perceived to be more 
inconsistent than small ones. 
Elaborative encoding. As in initial encoding (but see below), subjects 
were faster with small sets than with large ones (F(1, 14) = 79.4) and 
’ Unless otherwise indicated, the .05 level is used. 
* On the physical match, where the matching criterion was clear cut, subjects were 
highly accurate (mean accuracy, 99%), with virtually no differences due to set size or 
consistency. Under semantic match, however. where the matching criterion was more 
subjective, subjects were less accurate (87%). As the error rate was proportional to the 
number of traits in the set, and independent of consistency, it will not be discussed further. 
’ We also performed an analysis of the median latencies taken only from those sets in 
which subjects were correct in the first task. There were no differences between this 






































































































































































































































IMPRESSION FORMATION 225 
with consistent sets than with inconsistent ones (F(1, 14) = 6.37). The 
interaction between set size and consistency failed to reach significance 
(F(1, 14) = 3.13, p = .I). 
Impression formation. Subjects who performed the first task under 
physical matching were reliably faster than those who performed under 
semantic matching (F(1, 28) = 9.11). However, none of the interactions 
involving the first task reached acceptable levels of significance. Subjects 
formed an impression faster with small sets than with large ones (F(1, 
28) = 46.8), and faster with consistent sets than with inconsistent ones 
(F(1, 28) = 20.5). Finally, the interaction between set size and consist- 
ency was reliable (F(1, 28) = 4.26) and similar in pattern to that under 
initial encoding. As hypothesized, differences between large and small 
sets were more pronounced when traits were inconsistent than when 
they were consistent. 
To summarize, both set size and consistency had reliable effects on 
the operations performed under the three orienting tasks. This, however, 
does not imply that these factors were of equal importance for perfor- 
mance on the different orienting tasks. For example, it is quite possible 
that set size explains more of the variance in initial encoding than in 
elaborative encoding. To assess this possibility, we computed the pro- 
portion of variance accounted for (eta square, Hays, 1963; Dwyer, 1974) 
by set size and consistency under each of the three tasks. Table 2 presents 
these proportions. It is quite clear that in respect to explaining the total 
variance, the contribution of set size decreases, and that of consistency 
increases as we move from initial encoding, through elaborative encod- 
ing, to impression formation. 
So far we have made one assumption about the temporal order of the 
four processes in impression formation; that is, the decision occurs after 
the information has been integrated. The remaining operations, however, 
are likely to occur in cascade (McClelland, 1979), each starting before 
the other is completed (see Posner, 1978, for the temporal order of 
activation of semantic and physical codes). As such, these processes 
overlap with and feedback into each other. Suppose, however, one is 
willing to make the assumption that integration for the most part is 
performed after each piece of information is elaboratively encoded. Then 
one can estimate the time it takes to integrate and decide, that is, the 
TABLE 2 
FROP~RTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED 
Processing Task Set size 
Initial encoding .91 
Elaborative encoding .73 






integration-decision interval, by subtracting elaborative encoding time 
from impression formation time. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
(set size x consistency) was performed on these intervals. It revealed 
a reliable consistency effect (F(1, 140 = 5.67), indicating that the in- 
tegration-decision interval was shorter for consistent than for incon- 
sistent sets. Set size did not reach acceptable levels of significance (F( 1, 
14) = 1.36). However, the mean intervals were in marked contrast to 
previous analyses, namely, they were greater for snail sets than for 
large ones. Finally, the interaction between set size and consistency 
failed to reach significance. 
In general, the finding on differential sensitivity to the quantity of the 
information and to its consistency support the partition of impression 
formation into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and 
decision. Nonetheless, there remains a problem with distinguishing be- 
tween integration and decision. This is a theoretically important juncture 
in the impression formation process. A marked change in the effects of 
consistency and amount of information is presumed to occur at this 
point. This is to say, integration is supposed to be most sensitive to 
changes in consistency, whereas decision should be insensitive to this; 
at the same time, decision is supposed to be facilitated by increasing 
amounts of information, whereas integration should be hindered. How- 
ever, it is difficult to devise an orienting task that will separate cleanly 
these two operations; once individuals deliberately integrate information, 
they seem automatically to proceed to make a decision. 
Even though integration may not be examined independently of de- 
cision, the opposite can be attempted. In order to do so-to separate 
the effects of decision from integration-we tried to eliminate the need 
for integration by presenting “preintegrated” information. Such a pro- 
cedure allows individuals to decide without having to integrate just prior 
to the decision. This is done in the second study by presenting a single 
trait (instead of the multitrait set) as a stimulus in the three orienting 
tasks. Here, the amount of information is varied by manipulating the 
associative structure of each trait, that is, its implicit information. More 
specifically, the traits were classified according to whether they implied 
a large number of other traits or only few. The former are labeled im- 
plication-rich, and the latter implication-poor. 
According to our analysis, since initial encoding is minimally concerned 
with semantic features, it should be insensitive to whether the trait is 
implication-rich or implication-poor. Also, inasmuch as the implications 
are accessed via the activation of a single schema (i.e., they are “prein- 
tegrated”), the time to elaboratively encode an implication-poor trait 
should be no different than that for elaboratively encoding an implication- 
rich trait (Hayes-Roth, 1977; Smith et al., 1978). Integration is assumed 
to be bypassed since the implications of a trait are by definition already 
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integrated. The decision operation, however, still ought to benefit from 
increasing amounts of information, here, implicit information. Therefore, 
the decision time for an implication-rich trait should be faster than that 
for an implication-poor one. Since neither initial nor elaborative encoding 
should be affected by the amount of implicit information associated with 
a trait, differences in the impression formation latencies must be due to 




Thirty students at the University of Michigan served as subjects. They were recruited 
through advertisement in local papers and were paid $3.50 for their participation. 
Stimuli 
One hundred traits were taken from Anderson’s (1968) with the following restrictions: 
(i) each trait consisted of a single word, (ii) containing less than 10 characters, (iii) with 
a frequency between 7 and 521 (Carroll, Davis, & Richman, 1971; index d). Fifty of the 
traits were positive (likability values between 430 and 573), and 50 were negative (likability 
values between 26 and 169). Traits were presented to subjects in four different random 
orders. Subjects were asked to estimate the number of traits that were implied by the given 
trait, that is, “the number of other traits that covary (go together) with a given trait, so 
that when an individual has trait A he is likely to have trait B.” All ratings were made 
on a 9-point scale (1 = very few, 5 = moderate, 9 = very many). To validate this 
procedure, 42 traits (20 positive and 22 negative) were drawn at random from the above 
100 traits. A group of 11 different subjects were asked to write down all traits implied by 
each of the 42 traits. For each trait we computed the mean (across subjects) of the estimated 
number of implied traits and the actual number of of the traits listed by the subjects. The 
rank-order correlation between the two was .64 (p < .Ol). 
Four categories of traits were constructed by taking 10 traits that were below the mean 
for the estimated number of implications and 10 traits that were above the mean, separately 
for positive and negative traits. These traits, hereafter called experimental traits, are shown 
in Table 3. In addition to these, 40 additional traits were chosen according to the same 
criteria, and served as fillers during the first part of the experiment (see procedure). Each 
of the experimental traits was paired with an unrelated trait (likability values between 250 
and 350). Each of the fillers was matched with a synonym (Roger’s Internafional Thesaurus, 
third edition). Finally, we chose 20 more traits for use during the practice. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run under the same conditions as those in Study 1 (i.e., individually, 
under computer control, with the same monitor and response buttons). Also, the first two 
parts of the experiment were identical in structure to those of Study 1. To begin, subjects 
performed either under physical matching instructions or under semantic matching in- 
structions. Under physical matching they responded “yes” . Immediately after reading the 
first trait, and then “yes” if this trait was identical to the probe, and “no” otherwise. 
Under semantic matching instructions, they responded with “yes” after reading the first 
trait, and then “yes” if the probe was similar in meaning to the first trait, and “no” 
otherwise. Next, during the impression part, subjects received only the experimental traits 
and were instructed to form an impression about a person described by each trait. Again. 














































the rating procedure used was identical to that in Study I. In the third part, subjects were 
presented with the experimental traits and asked to indicate their importance in forming 
an opinion of a stranger. This was done on a 6-point scale (1 = very unimportant. 6 
= very important). Finally, in the fourth part, subjects were presented with the experi- 
mental traits again, and were asked to rate them for the number of implied traits (1 = 
very few. . . 6 = very many). 
The order of the four parts was the same for all subjects. The first two parts were 
preceded first by numbers tasks designed to familiarize the subjects with the response 
mode, and then by 20 warm-up trials with the practice traits. Subjects received the traits 
in a different random order and could respond at their own pace. They were instructed 
to respond as accurately and as fast as they could, and it was emphasized that accuracy 
should not be sacrificed for speed. 
Results and Discussion 
The rating of the amount of implicit information (part 4) was included 
as a manipulation check. A four-way repeated measures ANOVA [first 
task X trait type (implication-rich vs implication-poor) x likability x 
traits] was performed on these judgments. Task, likability, as well as 
their interactions, all failed to reach acceptable level of significance 
(minimum p > .l). Trait-type effect was highly reliable (F(1, 28) = 43.3), 
with implication-rich traits rated as having more implications than im- 
plication-poor traits (4.14 vs 3.41). 
As before, during the first part subjects made two responses on each 
trial. The first, after reading the trait description, indicated the processing 
time for initial encoding or for elaborative encoding. The second, after 
the probe trait, carried through with the rationale given for the orienting 
task and was used as an accuracy measure. As in Study 1, subjects were 
highly accurate under physical matching instructions (see Table 4), with 
no difference due either to likability or trait type. Unexpectedly, under 
semantic matching, subjects made twice as many errors in responding 
to the implication-poor traits than in responding to the implication-rich 
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ones (see Table 4). This may indicate that the meaning of the former is 
less established than that of the latter, even though traits were matched 
for frequency. 
For each combination of trait type and likability, we calculated the 
median latency. These medians were taken from trials with correct re- 
sponses in the first part, and all trials in the impression part (also see 
footnote 3). Table 4 presents the mean latencies and error rates for the 
likability and trait-type factors. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
(trait type x likability) was performed on these scores under initial 
encoding and under elaborative encoding. In addition, a three-way re- 
peated measures (trait type x likability x first task) was performed on 
the impression times. None of the main effects or interactions in the 
analysis of the initial encoding latencies or the elaborative encoding 
latencies reached acceptable levels of significance (minimum p > .18). 
The analysis of the impression times revealed that trait type was the 
only reliable effect (F(1, 28) = 9.7). namely, impressions were formed 
faster with implication-rich traits than with implication-poor ones. 
The lack of relationship between likability and processing time is man- 
ifested also in the low correlations between direction of judgment and 
the impression latency. The rank order correlation between the former 
and the latter was .Ol, suggesting that there is no difference in operating 
upon positive and negative traits. This, however, does not exclude the 
possibility that the traits leading to an extreme impression are processed 
differently from those leading to a moderate impression. Judd and Kulik 
(1979), for example, found that judgments were made faster on items 
with which the person strongly agreed or strongly disagreed. We thus 
recoded the impressions according to their extremity, assigning 1 to the 
most extreme impressions (1 and 6), 2 to less extreme (2 and 5), and 3 
to the least extreme impressions (3 and 4). Extremity was reliably as- 
sociated with the amount of implicit information (x2 (2) = 69.66, p < 
.OOl) such that only 42% of the implication-poor traits generated extreme 
impressions (1 or 6) whereas 64% of the implication-rich traits did so. 
This raises the unhappy possibility that the effects of implicit information 
were mediated by the extremity of the impression. To remove the con- 
taminating effect of extremity, we performed a regression of the impres- 
sion time on extremity. The residuals of the regression were then ex- 
amined in an analysis of variance similar to the one performed on raw 
impression time. If the effects of implicit information on processing time 
were mediated by extremity, they should disappear in the analysis of 
the residuals. However, the pattern of results in the residuals analysis 
was in fact identical to that of the raw latencies. As before, neither 
likability nor the interaction was reliable. The trait-type effect remained 
reliable, albeit marginally so (F( 1, 27) = 3.51, p = .07). Thus, it seems 
that the effect of the amount of implicit information cannot be explained 
by the extremity of the judgment. 
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Finally, subjects rated the traits for their importance in determining 
an impression. A four-way repeated measures ANOVA (first task x trait 
type x likability x traits) was performed on these ratings. Subjects who 
started with the physical matching orienting task rated the traits as more 
important than those who started with semantic matching (F(1, 28) = 
6.66). Also, implication-rich traits were rated as more important in form- 
ing an impression than implication-poor ones (F(1, 28) = 24.7). This 
tallies with the finding that it was easier to make a decision on the basis 
of the implication-rich than implication-poor traits. Likability, as well 
as all the interactions, failed to reach significance (minimum p < .l). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This paper attempts to delineate the set of operations carried out in 
forming an impression of another person. Four functionally distinct pro- 
cesses were hypothesized, namely, initial encoding, elaborative encod- 
ing, integration, and decision. They were identified empirically on the 
basis of their differential sensitivity to the amount and consistency of 
information in a trait description: In Study 1 a large trait set hindered 
processing to a greater extent than did a small one. More importantly, 
this effect varied with the operation being performed. It was most pro- 
nounced during initial encoding, moderately so during elaborative en- 
coding, and least pronounced during the integration-decision interval. 
Indeed, there was a tendency for the integration-decision interval to 
decrease as set size increased. Varying consistency produced the op- 
posite pattern of results. Specifically, while an inconsistent trait descrip- 
tion generally hindered processing to a larger extent than a consistent 
trait description, the effect was least pronounced during initial encoding, 
moderately so during elaborative encoding, and most pronounced during 
the integration-decision interval. In Study 2, the quantity of information 
in a description was manipulated via the associative structure, that is, 
the implicit knowledge activated by a trait (rather than set size). Pre- 
sumably because implicit information is “preintegrated,” implication- 
rich traits did not hinder initial or elaborative encoding any more than 
implication-poor traits. The decision operation, however, was performed 
more rapidly with implication-rich traits than with implication-poor ones. 
This effect seems theoretically comparable to the tendency in Study 1 
for the integration-decision interval to decrease as set size increased. 
In any case, it strongly suggests that once information is organized by 
a schema, the “richer” the representation, the easier it is to arrive at 
a decision. 
Partitioning impression formation in this manner emphasizes that the 
representation of a trait description in memory will depend on the op- 
erations that have been performed on such information. This has some 
interesting implications. To illustrate, recall our assumption that infor- 
mation will be stored in a discrete fashion following elaborative encoding, 
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and in a unified fashion following integration. This postulate about how 
trait information is stored in memory inevitably leads to hypotheses 
about the effect of the encoding operations on accessibility. In a recent 
experiment (Burnstein & Schul, Note 2) we observed that once trait 
information has been integrated, there is no difference between an ini- 
tially consistent and an initially inconsistent description in respect to 
accessibility. If the traits undergo only elaborative encoding, however, 
the consistent description is retrieved with considerably greater accuracy 
than the inconsistent one. Our partitioning also makes explicit that dif- 
ferences in the representation can be due to differences in the extent to 
which the same operation is performed as well as to differences in the 
kind of operations. For example, consider the processing of information 
that is either relevant or irrelevant to a judgment. Both may undergo the 
same operations, but the relevant information is likely to receive more 
elaborative encoding than irrelevant information. As a consequence, not 
only should the former be more accessible than the latter, but it will also 
occupy a more central position in the knowledge structure upon which 
the judgment is based (Lingle, Geva, Ostrom. Leippe, & Baumgardner, 
1979; Schul & Burnstein, Note 1). 
Finally, our analysis makes the point that the operations performed 
during encoding and integration will determine the impact of the infor- 
mation on the judgment itself. This probably comes as no surprise. At 
least in the opinion change literature it is reasonably well established 
that information will have greater persuasive effect when it is elaborated 
upon; indeed, several studies indicate that the implicit information ac- 
tivated during elaborative encoding of a persuasive message seems to 
have more influence than the given information (Burnstein & Vinokur, 
1977; Caccioppo & Petty, 1977; Carlston, 1980: Greenwald, 1968; Tesser, 
1978). Along the same lines we observed in Study 2 that traits that lend 
themselves to elaboration (implication-rich traits) were perceived as more 
important for forming an impression and actually produced more rapid 
as well as more extreme impressions than those that do not (implication- 
poor traits). In all likelihood, therefore, the operations used to form an 
impression of another person are comparable to those used to fashion 
other opinions as well. If so, these operations should play a significant 
role in any general explanation of opinion formation and persuasion. 
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